Introduction
In this paper the focus is on the child benefi t package for working families and its contribution to tackling inwork child poverty. Tackling child poverty is high on the European Union's political agenda. It was a priority in the drew attention to the fact that in the majority of the EU member states, children are at a higher risk of poverty than the population as a whole. More recent analyses of the EU-SILC (Tarki, 2010; Atkinson and Marlier, 2010; Tarki, 2011) confi rmed this fi nding. As a part of its 10-year economic plan, the June 2010 European Council set the target to reduce poverty and social exclusion in the EU by 20 million (European Council, 2010) . If this objective is to be achieved, parents and their children will need to be a key focus of anti-poverty policies. There are a number of reasons why children are living in poverty when their parents are employed. One explanation is that their earnings are too low either because they are working part time and/or full-time but their wage is low. Public policy can intervene in the market to enhance earnings by enacting equal pay legislation or establishing a statutory minimum wage. The second explanation for the presence of in-work child poverty is that families may be taxed into poverty -the direct taxes taken in income tax and social insurance contributions The sum of the number of months spent in employment divided by number of months spent in employment/studying/ retired/unemployed/inactive, of all working age adults in the household. 3
Own analysis of EU SILC 2009.
reduces their gross incomes so much that they fall below the poverty threshold. The third explanation is that the cash benefi ts paid by the state to help parents with the costs of raising children are inadequate. Finally the reason why a child with a working parent may be poor is that after having paid for housing and other charges the resources available for consumption are too little.
Marx, Marchal and Nolan (forthcoming) has covered statutory minimum wages. This paper will review the other elements of the package. It will analyse the different types of cash and tax benefi ts for families with children, assess how adequate they are as anti-poverty devices and how the adequacy of the child benefi t package is linked to the structure of the benefi t package. In addition this paper aims to gauge how the contribution of child benefi t packages in preventing poverty among low paid households has developed over the past two decades. Although income maintenance is evidently not the sole function of child benefi t schemes, the principal focus in this paper is thus on the role of child benefi t packages in making the income package of low income workers (more) adequate.
Many of these issues have already been dealt with in earlier studies. Various studies have looked in detail at the structure of the child benefi t package (e.g. Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Bradshaw, 2010) . Corak et al. (2005) , Matsaganis et al. (2005) , Bäckman and Ferrarini (2011), Van Lancker et al. (2012) have documented the adequacy of child support arrangements in terms of poverty alleviation using empirical income surveys. Analyzing trends in family allowances between 1949 and 1997 , Gauthier (1999 has found moderate increases during the 1950s-60s golden age of the welfare state, and no major decreases since (see also Kamerman and Kahn, 2001; Ferrarini, 2006) . Our data make it possible to expand on previous studies in several ways. First, our data cover 27 countries, allowing to include Western European countries, Eastern European countries as well as the United States. Second, we are able to examine the most recent trends in child benefi t packages (up to 2009). As was shown in Van
Mechelen and Marchal (forthcoming), during the past two decades social assistance benefi t levels have not kept pace with median equivalised income in many EU member states. The purpose of this paper is to establish whether and to what extent child benefi t packages have been able to escape welfare erosion. Third, our focus is on the level of child benefi t packages as compared to the poverty line (measured as 60% of median equivalised household income) whereas most studies using model families measure the child benefi t package as a proportion of gross or net wages. For the sake of completeness we also present data on the value of the child benefi t package in purchasing power standards and as a proportion of net disposable income. Unlike comparative studies using income surveys, we will thus focus on the capacity of benefi t levels to lift families with children out of poverty, rather than on actual amount of poverty reduction achieved. This means that we are able to leave aside cross country differences in take-up or the proportion of low income families or single parents and to focus on the adequacy of child benefi t
Child Poverty as a Government Priority packages of families at low pay. Fourth, we will assess the relationship between the adequacy of the child benefi t package and its structure. We will consider the question of whether or not child benefi t packages that consist of mainly income related benefi ts provide better minimum income protection for low paid workers. In social policy literature there is considerable disagreement on the link between low-income targeting and the effectiveness of social protection (Beslin, 1990; Tullock, 1997; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Whiteford, 2008; Kenworthy, 2011; Slater, 2011) . This paper will shed some light on the empirical relationship between the income gradient in child benefi t packages and their adequacy as measured against the poverty line. Fourth, the data allow us to take into account the role of child care costs. In many countries governments have initiated national childcare strategies to expand the provision of affordable childcare facilities (Plantenga, 2005; Daly 2010 and . We will investigate the impact of childcare costs on the child benefi t package.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present our data and raise some measurement issues. Section three touches upon the structure of child benefi t packages and assesses the degree to which child benefi t packages are targeted at low paid workers. In section four we look at the adequacy in terms of the poverty alleviation of child benefi t levels for one earner couples who also often have exceptionally high poverty risks. This section also assesses the relationship between the adequacy of child benefi t packages and the degree of low income targeting. Section fi ve discusses trends in child benefi t levels in the period 1992-2009. Section six concludes.
Data and measurement issues
In this paper we focus on the child benefi ts package including:
• tax benefi ts or allowances which reduce the direct tax liability in respect of children,
• child cash benefi ts whether income tested or universal,
• housing benefi ts or allowances that take account of the presence of a child,
• social assistance top-ups for low wage earning families that vary by the number and/or age of children
• any mitigation of local taxes in respect of children
• for a pre-school child we also take account of any direct support for the costs of full-time day care in the most prevalent form of full-time day care in each country.
We have classifi ed tax credits as tax benefi ts to be consistent with Ferrarini et al. (forthcoming) . There are arguments to justify this -it is called a tax credit and administered (assessed and paid) by the tax authorities. However it has the characteristics of an income tested cash benefi t (see below) and in countries like the UK it is treated as social not tax expenditure in the public accounts.
In some previous comparisons using the model family method account has also been taken of charges for a standard package of health care and charges (or benefi ts) associated with education (see, for example, Bradshaw and Finch, 2002) . However these have not been included in this comparison, in part because of the evidence that they are not a very big element in the child benefi t package in the EU.
The value and structure of the child benefi t package is assessed by deducting the net income of a hypothetical childless couple from the net income of a couple with children at the same earnings level. In the case of a single parent the comparison is the extra over a single person without children. The net incomes are drawn from the CSB-MIPI data.
The CSB-MIPI dataset derives from data collection through a network of national experts and contains model family simulations for both workers and people at working age not in work (see also Marx and Nelson, forthcoming; Van Mechelen and Marchal, forthcoming; Marx et al., forthcoming and Goedemé, forthcoming) . 4 For workers, the focus is on the net income packages of double earner families (both adults working full time, national average male earnings plus national average female earnings), single earner families on average wage (one adult working full time, national average male earnings) and single earner families on minimum wage (or, for countries without a national minimum wage, 50% of the average male earnings). The CSB-MIPI dataset includes 3 family types with children: a married couple with children aged 7 and 14, a lone parent with children of the same age, and a lone par- ent with a pre-school child. Note that the assumption regarding the age of the children is quite relevant given that some countries' tax and cash benefi ts for children tend to vary substantially by age (see Bradshaw and Finch 2002) .
It is also important to note that part of the benefi t package that we observe consists of benefi ts for additional household members in general, not specifi cally children. In addition, the level of housing allowance in the CSB-MIPI data tends to be higher for families with children compared to families without children. This is partly because of the benefi ts specifi cally targeted to families with children in the housing allowance system but partly due to the underlying assumption in the CSB-MIPI dataset that families with children live in bigger and therefore more expensive accommodation than families without children.
Finally, in the literature various indexes have been used to consider cross-country differences in the child benefi t package. Purchasing power standards (PPSs) have been used to compare the purchasing power of benefi t amounts across countries. A more relative approach is to set the benefi t package against average wage (see, for
example Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2006) or against the model family's net disposable income (see, for example, Wennemo, 1992) . In this paper we use primarily 60% of national median equivalised household income as a benchmark. By comparing benefi t packages to the poverty line, we aim to provide insight in the relevance of child benefi t packages in poverty alleviation (see also Ferrarini et al., forthcoming) . However, child benefi t packages are also presented in purchasing power parities in order to provide an absolute comparison. Moreover, the annex contains information on benefi t levels as a proportion of net disposable income. There appears to be a strong relationship between benefi t packages as a proportion of median equivalised income and benefi t levels as a percentage of net disposable income. Therefore, our conclusions scarcely vary with the indicator used.
3. The structure of the child benefit package Before we start assessing the level and adequacy of child benefi t packages, it is important to discuss the crosscountry variation in the composition of the child benefi t package. Countries use different mixes of tax benefi ts and cash benefi ts for delivering help to families with children. Figure 1 distinguishes between income related and universal -i.e. non-income related -cash benefi ts. Income related benefi ts aim to target direct cash transfers to low income families. Governments may decide to target benefi ts to other specifi c groups, for example lone parents or disabled children. These specifi c child benefi ts are not included in Table 1 . The child benefi t package for lone parents is discussed in section 4. Table 1 does include income tax components that aim to redistribute income from childless families to families with dependent children -either tax allowances or tax credits specifi cally aimed at families with children. Tax allowances are deducted from taxable income whereas tax credits are subtracted from the amount of tax due. Tax credits may be wasteable or non-wasteable. Non-wasteable or refundable tax credits are tax benefi ts that can be paid as cash transfer to the taxpayer whenever the benefi t exceeds tax liability. Wasteable tax credits can only be used if tax liability is positive. Both cash and tax benefi ts tend to vary by the age and the number of children (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; . We assume a couple with two children, aged 7 and 14. Table 1 shows that eleven out of fi fteen old EU member states have universal child cash benefi ts. The main exceptions are Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany: these countries have no universal cash benefi ts for families with children. Belgium, Greece and France are exceptions to some extent. In Belgium and Greece working families are entitled to employment based rather than universal non-income related benefi ts (while non-working families usually receive income related benefi ts). In France only families with 2 or more children can receive non-income related cash benefi ts. Universal cash benefi ts for families with children are also prominent in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the non-income related child benefi ts in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania.
The majority of new EU countries also provide income related child cash benefi ts: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Romania. Southern European countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain too have income related cash benefi ts for families with children. Income related cash benefi t schemes also exist in the Netherlands, Ireland and France. However, in these countries means-tested benefi t schemes provide supplements to the universal benefi ts for low-income families. In Ireland the 'Family Income Supplement' is an employment based scheme that gives extra fi nancial support to people on low pay. The 'Allocation de rentrée scolaire' in France is a means tested annual benefi t for families with children between 6 and 18.
The majority of both EU15 and EU10 combine cash benefi ts with tax benefi ts for families with children. Tax benefi ts include tax allowances and tax credits. In two countries the child benefi t package of working families consists mainly of tax benefi ts: Germany and the United States. Germany replaced its universal cash benefi t scheme with an option model of tax credits and tax allowances in 1996. Families with children are taxed in the most favourable way, which in most cases is by making use of the tax credit. This model is functionally very similar to universal cash child benefi t. The United States has two tax credits for families with children: the Child Tax Credit -which is wasteable and tapers away with rising income -and the Additional Child Tax Credit -which is refundable and can be claimed by taxpayers who are ineligible to claim the non-refundable child tax credit, because it exceeds their total tax liability. Evidence for the OECD countries shows that tax credits for families with children have grown in importance, especially during the nineties (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Immervoll and Pierson 2009 ; see also Nelson in this volume).
As shown by Table 1 , in most countries the child benefi t package is made up of a mixture of different types of cash benefi ts and tax benefi ts. Countries like France and Romania, for example, combine a universal cash benefi t with both income related cash benefi ts and tax reliefs. Many of these elements are targeted so that the package as a whole is larger for low wage earner families. The degree to which the child benefi t package is targeted at low paid workers depends on the variation by earnings of each benefi t included and on how various benefi t types are combined into one package. This section fi rst focuses on the degree of targeting of each component separately. Next we turn to the benefi t package as a whole. The degree of targeting of the benefi t package as a whole is measured by an index that compares the child benefi t package of a single earner family on minimum wage with that of a similar family on average wage (see Table 2 ).
The degree of targeting is measured by setting the child benefi t package of a one earner family on minimum wage against that of a similar family on average wage. One could argue that the child benefi t package of a double earner family on average wage may be an even more appropriate benchmark to measure the degree of targeting. However, as the package of double earner families is close to zero in some countries, this benchmark would yield trivial results. Moreover, the ranking of countries varies scarcely with the benchmark used. Table 2 shows the structure of child benefi t package of two one earner families -one on average wage and one on minimum wage (Table A1 in annex contains the child benefi t package of a double earner family on two times average wage). Universal cash benefi ts are evidently badly targeted as they provide the same amount to all families regardless of earnings. The selectivity of income related cash benefi ts and tax benefi ts hinges on the design of the scheme. A crucial factor as far as income related cash benefi ts are concerned, is the strictness of the means-test involved. In the Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland and Spain one earner families on the minimum wage tend to receive income related cash benefi ts whereas one earner families on average wage do not. By contrast, in countries like Italy, Portugal, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovenia even double earner families on average earnings receive income related benefi ts. Similarly, the income gradient of child tax benefi ts depends largely on the type and design of the scheme. An important distinction here is between wasteable and non-wasteable tax credits. Low income families often fail to benefi t from tax allowances or wasteable tax credits, simply because they pay no taxes. This is the reason why in a number of Southern, Central and Eastern European countries tax benefi ts are less targeted to working families on low pay than in the 'old' EU member states and the US. By contrast, refundable tax credits -if non-income related like in Austria and Germany -are functionally very similar to universal cash benefi ts:
high income families are entitled to universal benefi ts, though as a percentage of their net income they are not so important. Finally, income related refundable tax credits like in the United Kingdom and the United States bear a strong resemblance to income related cash benefi ts: they are an important element of the child benefi t package of one earner families, in particular of minimum wage earners, but not of double earner families. Table 2 also demonstrates that in a number of countries, the degree of targeting is strengthened through meanstested benefi ts such as housing allowances or social assistance top-ups that take account of the presence of a child. This is most notably the case in the US, Portugal, Luxembourg and Lithuania. In the US a considerable part of the child benefi t package of minimum wage earners consists of food stamps provided under the SNAP-programme (see Van Mechelen and Marchal, forthcoming).
The selectivity of income-related cash and tax benefi ts is only one important factor in explaining the extent to which child benefi t packages are targeted at low paid workers. The interaction of benefi t types included in the benefi t package also plays a role. For example, although income-related cash benefi ts aimed at the very needy are an important tool to assist families with children in Spain, the child benefi t system as a whole is fairly badly targeted at low income parents because it also includes child tax benefi ts which mainly favour the better-off. As shown in the fi nal column in Table 2 , the low income targeting index for Spain amounts to 0.6, meaning that the child benefi t package of a single earner couple on minimum wage is 40% below the package of a similar family on average Portugal and the United States). In these countries, the child benefi t package is often three times higher for one earner families on low pay as compared with families on average wage. By contrast, the low income targeting index is particularly below average in countries where child tax benefi ts favour average earners and disadvantage low-paid workers, including Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Spain.
The value of the child benefit package
How, then, is the degree of low income targeting linked to the generosity of the child benefi t package of low paid workers? Before we start answering this question, let us look at the cross-country variation in the value and adequacy of the child benefi t package. In this section we look at the level of the child benefi t package of one earner families but also of other vulnerable persons. We compare the level of the package for a lone parent and a couple.
In addition, we examine how child care costs affect the child benefi t package of a lone parent. Although obviously child benefi ts may have been quite insuffi cient to protect minimum wage earners and their households against poverty, child benefi t packages play an important role in narrowing the gap between net income and 60% of median equivalent income. In the majority of countries the child benefi t package of minimum wage earners amounts to 15% or more of the poverty line. But there is considerable cross-country variation. The child benefi t package varies from more than 25% of the poverty line in Luxembourg, Portugal, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Lithuania to 6% or less in Spain, Estonia, Norway and Latvia. Due to targeting, child benefi t packages of single earners on average wage tend to be smaller as compared with families on minimum wage. They also make a smaller contribution to cross-country differences, varying from 6% or even less in Spain, Portugal and
Single earners
Norway to 15 to 20% in Germany, Belgium, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia.
The child benefi t package is presented in fi gure 1 both as a proportion of median equivalised income and in purchasing power parities. 6 It is noteworthy that the ranking varies considerably with the indicator used. Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary have substantial child benefi t packages if a percentage of median equivalent income is 6 See table 4-A1 in annex for benefi t levels expressed as a proportion of net disposable income.
used. This means that child benefi ts are an important element in reducing the gap between net average wage and the poverty line. However, in terms of purchasing power parities benefi t levels they are fairly low. By contrast, Norway and Sweden move up the ranking if purchasing power parities are used instead of a percentage of net disposable income.
How the package treats couples compared with lone parents
During the past decades many countries have seen a state-led expansion of policies aimed at reconciling the work/family confl ict, as part of the rise of what Lewis has described as the 'adult-worker' model (Lewis, 2001;  Guillari and Lewis, 2011) . This model assumes and encourages employment on the part of both men and women.
The new focus on women's labour market participation underlies many of the policy reforms aimed at creating disincentives for single-earnership, increasing child care facilities and cutting lone mothers' eligibility for stayat-home support (Daly 2011 ). Bäckman and Ferrarini (2011) have shown that in general these kind of dual-earner transfers are rather effective in alleviating poverty among single mothers, because of their impact on the ability of single parents to work and to raise market income. Nevertheless, the income position of lone parents working at low pay remains weak, as shown in Figure 2 .
In most countries the child benefi t package is more generous to lone parents than couples. Especially the Nordic countries but also Belgium are all much more generous to lone parents in their child benefi t package.
7
This means that governments have made some effort via a premium within the package to recognise the extra costs or hardships of parents raising children alone. The Nordic countries also have generally more effective child maintenance regimes (Skinner et al, 2007) . As shown in Figure 2 , the child benefi t package varies from about 5% of the poverty line in Spain, Portugal and Greece to more than 30% in Sweden 8 , Finland, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Italy, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. In a number 7 The fi nding that in the Nordic countries and Belgium benefi ts are well targeted at lone parent families is based on a close inspection of the model family simulations. A simple comparison of the amount of the child benefi t package of a lone parent vis-à-vis a couple with children is fraught with diffi culties because the child benefi t package of a couple is measured as the extra income of a couple with children over a couple without children whereas in the case of a single parent the comparison is the extra over a single person without children. 8
For Sweden, the estimates in tables 4-2 and 4-3 include the guaranteed income maintenance.
of countries the total income package of a lone parent exceeds the poverty line (Latvia, Finland, the Netherlands,
Italy and the United Kingdom).
However there are a number of countries that make no concession to lone parents but treat them nearly identically (Spain, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic). Moreover, in the majority of countries the income package of a lone parent working at a low wage is still below the poverty line, even if the household has reached its full work intensity (i.e. the lone parent works full time full year).
The cost of childcare
In the context of the 'adult-worker' model (Lewis, 2001 ; Guillari and Lewis, 2011), many governments have initiated and delivered national childcare strategies to expand the provision of affordable childcare facilities for children under the age of three. This section evaluates the impact of the costs of childcare on the value of the child benefi t package of a single parent. Figure 3 shows how a lone parent with a preschool child would be supported if they worked full-time on low earnings but had to pay for fulltime childcare of the most prevalent kind in each country. What this fi gure ignores is that there are of course wide cross-national variation in the availability of childcare services. Saraceno (2011) has demonstrated that the coverage of childcare for children under three varies from less than 10% in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Greece, the Czech Republic and Austria to more than 50% in Sweden, Denmark and Belgium.
As shown in Figure 3 , the child benefi t package is now negative in many countries (Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic). In fact only in countries with childcare that is heavily subsidised does the child benefi t package remain positive (see Table A2 in annex).
Notwithstanding this, if we use 60% of median equivalent income as a benchmark, it seems that child benefi t packages contribute to preventing poverty among lone parents in many countries. In Belgium, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Austria, the net income of a lone parent working full time on low earnings is below the poverty line before the child benefi t package and above the poverty line after the child benefi t package.
But, again, in most countries lone parents at low pay are not adequately protected. The income package falls below the poverty line by more than 20 per cent in Ireland, Portugal, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech and the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Spain. Moreover, the comparison with median equivalent income confi rms the serious impact of child care costs on net income in a number of countries. For example, in Latvia the net income of a lone parent on minimum wage is above the poverty line before child care costs are taken into account, while it is inadequate after child care costs.
Targeting versus adequacy
Let us now turn to the relationship between low income targeting and the adequacy or generosity of child benefi t packages for minimum wage earners. As Figure 1 has shown, there is substantial variation across countries in the level of the child benefi t package although nowhere is it suffi ciently large to protect single earner couples on low pay against income poverty. Figure 1 also suggests that there is a positive relation between child benefi t levels and the income gradient in child benefi t packages. On the one hand, the top four performers in terms of the level of the child benefi t package relative to the poverty line (Portugal, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Lithuania) consist entirely of the countries where fi nancial help for families with children is extremely welltargeted at low-income households. On the other hand, exceptionally low packages for low paid workers are to be found in countries where single earners on low pay are entitled to even a smaller amount of benefi ts than average earners (Spain, Estonia and Latvia).
There is also a clear effect of low income targeting on the child benefi t package of minimum wage earners in countries with universal cash benefi ts. Countries where universal cash benefi ts are combined with income-related cash benefi ts (like in Ireland and France), housing allowances (like Austria) or supplementary benefi ts from social assistance (like in Finland), benefi t levels for low-income families are often quite generous, whereas in countries where the child benefi t package of a couple consists solely of universal cash benefi ts (like in Denmark), or where universal benefi ts are combined with tax benefi ts that favour the better-off (like in the Slovak Republic) benefi t levels are below average. The modest size of the child benefi t package of low wage earners in countries like in Denmark and Norway is really remarkable given the size of the welfare state in these countries. Tables A1 and A2 in annex show, moreover, that this fi nding also holds true for double earner families or if child benefi t packages are expressed as a proportion of net disposable income rather than the poverty line. However, Nordic countries do move up the ranking when the child benefi t package is compared in purchasing power standards instead of in relative terms, and if we focus on lone parents rather than on couples on low earnings. So Nordic countries do show some degree of targeting of benefi ts, at least according to household composition, but little reliance on income tests.
However, the overlap between low income targeting and generosity does not mean that selective benefi t systems are very effective in poverty alleviation. In social policy literature targeting is often associated with high, administrative costs, low take up rates and labour market disincentives (Atkinson, 1998; Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983; Notten and Gassman, 2008) . These phenomena may impose considerable constraints on the poverty reduction capacity of selective benefi t systems. In addition, Corak et al (2005) have shown that child poverty rates are not only dependent on the size of child-contingent spending of welfare states but also on the amount of public resources not specifi cally addressed to children. This helps explain the comparatively low child poverty rates in Nordic countries like Sweden, Denmark and Finland. But although the relationship between the generosity and poverty reducing capacity of child benefi t packages is not straightforward, empirical evidence shows that there is some degree of overlap (Ferrarini, 2006) . Moreover, various studies suggest that it is possible to mitigate the adverse effects of targeting by embedding selectivity within universalism (Skocpol 1991; Whiteford 2008; Kenworthy, 2011; . Kenworthy (2011, p61 .) points out that: 'what matters is that a nation have universalistic social insurance programs that convey a sense that the country's welfare state mainly serves to provide insurance against risk -old age, sickness, disability, and so on -rather than to redistribute money from the rich to the poor. In these conditions a country's policy makers will be able, if they wish to make extensive use of targeting in other programs, because those programs will be seen by the middle class as subsidiary'. Analysing the impact of child benefi ts on poverty outcomes of single mothers, fi nd that 'the best results are actually found in countries combining a universal system of child benefi ts with generous benefi ts specifi cally targeted towards single mothers'. If this also holds true for low income targeting, one might expect that families on low pay are best protected in countries that have universal cash benefi t systems with supplementary allowances targeted at low income families.
Targeting may thus be not so bad after all, if embedded in a universal social insurance context. Of course, the question remains what, as Titmuss (1968, p. 135 ) has stated, 'particular infrastructure of universalist services is needed in order to provide a framework of values and opportunity bases within and around which can be developed socially acceptable selective services aiming to discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of stigma, in favour of those whose needs are greatest?'.Indeed, further research is required on take up rates, labour market incentives and the political legitimacy of universal systems with a high degree of selectivity. An in-depth exploration of the poverty reduction effectiveness of child benefi t packages that are mixtures of universal and targeted benefi ts is a desirable further step in empirical research.
Trends in the value of the child benefit package
In the previous sections we have demonstrated that in most countries the child benefi t package is substantial, though not suffi cient to lift low earner families of out poverty. This section examines how child benefi t packages have developed over the past two decades. Have child benefi t packages for low income families in work become more or less adequate in preventing of child poverty? This section also asks whether the development of child benefi t packages for low paid workers has been part of a general trend in family policy. In most welfare states there is a tendency towards more targeting on the most needy (Gilbert, 2002) . Selective targeting is often advanced as a means to improve effi ciency and contain costs. This section examines whether within child benefi t packages the major trend has been also towards more targeting at low income families.
1990s
Figure 4 shows the trend in the level of child benefi t packages for the countries for which this information is available, mainly EU15-countries. Trend data for the 1990s draw on child benefi t packages as % of net disposable income, due to a lack of comparable data on poverty lines for this time period. These data confi rm to a large extent the fi ndings of Anne Gauthier (1999) : while many components of the welfare state experienced major decreases during the 1990s, state support for families did not decline sharply. In fact, in most countries many family types saw their child benefi t package increase, not only in real terms, but also as a proportion of the net disposable income. Relative increases indicate that the income components specifi cally aimed at families with children grew more slowly than the non-children-related income elements.
However this general trend hides major cross-country differences. Child benefi t packages have increased most strongly in Ireland and in Southern Europe. In Greece, Italy and Spain the trend has been particularly favourable for families earning an average wage, but less so for minimum wage earners. In Portugal the reverse is the case. In Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium the child benefi t package decreased relative to net disposable income, both for average wage earners and minimum wage earners. In Luxembourg and Sweden child benefi t packages eroded mainly for low-paid workers.
2000s
The picture of the 2000s is less favourable as compared to the previous decade. Table 3 shows the trend in the child benefi t package in the 24 EU member states and three US states (Nebraska, New Jersey and Texas). In most countries the child benefi t package decreased as a proportion of net disposable income. Child benefi t packages have also declined relative to the poverty line set at 60% of median equivalent income, indicating that state support for families with children has become less adequate as an anti-poverty device.
There are exceptions to the general welfare decline in child benefi t packages. In France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Lithuania tax-benefi t packages for families with children have increased for at least two of three cases shown in Table 3 . In the United States too the benefi t package has grown. In Nebraska, New Jersey and Texas the value of the tax allowance for families with children has risen for all family types under consideration, except for double earner families in Texas.
In general there are substantial differences in the developments between child benefi t packages of double earner and single earner families, however the direction and the extent of the differences varies. In countries like In Poland and Slovenia, the main reasons behind observed trends are changes in income related cash benefi ts. In
France, families on a low wage profi ted more strongly from changes in the child tax allowance system than families on average earnings.
It is noteworthy that in most English-speaking countries (with the exception of Ireland), the relative increase of child benefi t package is most strong for one earner families on the average wage. The introduction of the Child Tax Credit in the United Kingdom has caused child benefi t packages for one earner families on average earnings to increase, while the child benefi t package for minimum wage earners in one earner families decreased in real terms.
In sum, we have found indications that the adequacy of child benefi t packages for minimum wage earners as an instrument to prevent poverty has been declining during the past decade. This shift seems to be part of a general trend of decreasing child benefi ts relative to the poverty line that has affected both low paid families and the better off. However, the consequence of the erosion of state support for low-income families will clearly be much more serious than those for average wage earners. Moreover, in a substantial number of countries the low paid have been affected much more severely by declining benefi t levels than the better off. In a number of countries changes in child benefi ts have even contributed to the improvement of the living standards of the better off. However, the general tendency is not towards less targeting. While in a couple of countries we observe a drop in the child benefi t package as a percentage of the poverty line, particularly for low paid households, in other countries the low paid have been relatively spared from benefi t reductions.
Conclusions
In all the countries in the European Union the state contributes towards the costs of children even for double earning families. In most countries that contribution is in the form of a universal child benefi t. Indeed this is a peculiarly EU model -as will be seen in Bradshaw et al. (forthcoming) few countries in the CEE/CIS region have a genuine universal child benefi t and only Canada, Japan and Argentina in the rest of the world have such a benefi t.
However for many countries in the EU universal child benefi ts are not the only or most important element of the package. The child benefi t package is made up of a mixture of different types of cash benefi ts and tax benefi ts.
Child benefi t packages as a whole play an important role in narrowing the gap between net income and 60% of median equivalent income. Nevertheless, in many countries child benefi t packages fail to protect low wage earners against poverty. In all countries the incomes of single earner couples on minimum wages is below the poverty line.
The child benefi t package for a lone parent is more generous in most countries. However, how and whether child care costs are subsidised makes a big difference to the package especially for lone parents. The costs of childcare can undermine the value of the package in some countries.
The cross-country variation in the level of child benefi t packages for single earner families on low pay largely overlaps with the degree of low income targeting. Comparatively generous packages for low paid workers are to be found in countries where fi nancial help for families with children is well-targeted at low-income households by means of income-related cash benefi ts, refundable income-related tax credits or social assistance top-ups (Portugal, the Czech Republic, United Kingdom and Lithuania). From an anti-poverty perspective, this fi nding may be not so relevant. Despite their generosity towards low income families, selective benefi t systems may be quite ineffective with regard to poverty alleviation due to take-up problems and labour market disincentives (Atkinson, 1998; Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983; Notten and Gassman, 2008) . What is possibly more important is that child benefi t packages are also often above average in countries with universal cash benefi ts, but combined with incomerelated cash benefi ts, housing allowances or supplementary benefi ts from social assistance (Ireland, France, Austria, Finland). This fi nding may confi rm and reinforce the assertion in empirical literature that that targeting may be not so bad, if embedded in a universal social insurance context (Skocpol 1991; Whiteford 2008; Kenworthy, 2011; .
Finally, we traced changes in the level and structure of the packages over the period 1992 to 2009. Whereas during the 1990s child benefi t package have been able to escape welfare erosion, over the past decade the value of the package relative to median equivalised income has fallen in more countries than it has increased. This trend of decreasing child benefi ts has affected both low paid families and the better off. However, the consequences of the erosion of state support for low-income families will clearly be much more serious than those for average wage earners as child benefi t packages have become less and less adequate as an anti-poverty device. .
12 Based on the composition of child benefi t packages of three model families (couples) with 2 children (aged 7 and 14): a double earner couple -two times average wage, a single earner couple -average wage, a single earner couple-minimum wage (or half average wage for countries without a statutory minimum wage: DE, DK, FI, IT, SE) 13 In Belgium there exists no universal child cash benefi t as such. However, the employment based benefi t scheme and the income related cash benefi ts are so closely aligned that they are often perceived as forming one universal scheme (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002) . 14 In Greece the child cash benefi t system is employment-based. However, persons who receive unemployment benefi ts for at least two months and persons who are unable to work for 2 months continually can also receive child cash benefi ts (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/missoc_en.htm). 15 4 Relatively rich families tend be entitled to tax allowances rather than tax credits. However, here we only include tax credits as the three model families on which this table is based, receive tax credits but no tax allowances. (Van Mechelen et al, 2011) 19 19 In Lithuania, the income of all families with children have increased through the introduction of child tax allowances and cash benefi ts for families with children in the course of the past decade. However, it is not possible to calculate the relative increase between 2001 and 2009 given that the child benefi t package was initially zero. Source: CSB-MIPI Version 2/11 (Van Mechelen et al, 2011) 
